U.S. Troops for a U.N. Army
President Clinton once urged creation of an American “rapid deployment force” of peacekeepers that would be on instant call to the United Nations. He’s settled for something less. He won’t commit a U.S. contingent to a U.N. standing army or earmark units for U.N. duty in advance. Instead, some troops will train to be part-time peacekeepers and could serve under U.N. command on “a case-by-case basis.” And Washington will beef up the U.N.’s scrawny peacekeeping headquarters with staff, equipment and a training center.
That’s a step in the right direction, but Mr. Clinton could go further. It may be politically ill-advised to ask Congress to pre-commit U.S. forces. But he could prudently order the Pentagon to designate one or two U.S.-based brigades to be used exclusively for peacekeeping contingencies and have them participate in joint exercises with peacekeepers from other nations.
Article 43 of the United Nations Charter calls on members to commit forces “as soon as possible” to the Security Council for a standby army under “special agreements.” And President Truman promised the first U.N. General Assembly in 1946: “We shall press for the preparation of agreements in order that the Security Council may have at its disposal peace forces adequate to prevent acts of aggression.”
Cold war rivalry weakened this resolve, and Article 43 was relegated to international limbo until last year when Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali revived the idea of a U.N. standby army.
A standby army would reassure Americans who bridle at unending military commitments overseas. No longer the world’s policeman, America would contribute its share — no more — to a world police force. It is less likely to become bogged down overseas if other nations’ troops are trained to take their turn. Somalia is a case in point.
Under the Clinton directive, U.S. troops serving under U.N. command will retain separate reporting channels to Washington and refuse to obey U.N. orders that they judge to be against the law, beyond the U.N. mandate or “militarily imprudent and unsound.” The U.S. will also reserve its sovereign right to “terminate” its participation in a peacekeeping operation.
But the key to effective peacekeeping is having well-equipped and well-funded forces, trained to work together and ready for instant deployment. That’s where the Clinton commitment falls short. Meanwhile, Pentagon funds for peacekeeping are tied up in an unseemly turf squabble with the State Department. If Mr. Clinton doesn’t knock heads, he will jeopardize support for U.N. operations.
Peacekeeping also requires special training to restrain the use of force and avoid making enemies. Peacekeepers learn to perform the same way people get to Carnegie Hall — practice, practice, practice. That’s best done by designating U.S. units whose primary mission is peacekeeping. Joint exercises would make sure that these troops are not at the mercy of untrained allies.
Commander-in-Chief Clinton can better prepare the armed services for post-cold war contingencies by ordering these extra steps.
An Agenda for Peace
Recognizing the limitations of peacekeeping, especially as such efforts were becoming prevalent in the early 1990s, the UN Security Council convened in 1992 in a first-time meeting of heads of state. The 15 members finished the conference by issuing a statement calling on then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to write a report recommending future reforms. In their statement, the heads-of-state recognized that,
“The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.”[1]
The Security Council saw what many critics of peacekeeping have suggested, and some recent failures had made obvious: peacekeeping alone, as then practiced, was not enough to ensure lasting peace.
Boutros-Ghali submitted his response some months later, in the form of An Agenda for Peace. In it, he outlined a number of additional processes of preventative diplomacy the international community could use before peacekeeping, or simultaneously. He also suggested distinct definitions for peacemaking and peacekeeping, and referenced Chapter VII of the UN Charter to justify military involvement without the consent of both parties.[2] Previously, these concepts had not been formally addressed by the UN’s leadership. However, An Agenda for Peace’s most significant contribution to the modern understanding of peace is its introduction of the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding.” Boutros-Ghali defines “post-conflict peace-building” as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”[3]
The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding has been especially important in the academic discipline of peace and conflict studies. It has been adopted by a number of scholars to suggest a framework for peace that addresses not only the latent forms of physical violence, but also aspects of a society that are structurally violent, and could lead to a re-emergence of fighting (see the discussion of positive peace in the article on peace and conflict studies).
[edit]Notes
- ^ UN Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 1992, 34.
- ^ Michael W. Doyle, “Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping,” 2-3.
- ^ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” II.21.
[edit]Resources
An Agenda for Peace Full text on UN website
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